WASHINGTON - Pay arrangements at failed US investment banks Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, two of the most spectacular casualties of the global financial crisis, highlight the extent to which executives had an incentive to improve short-term results at the risk of an implosion later on, research led by Harvard Law School professor Lucian Bebchuk shows.*

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